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FOR THE SAKE OF THE CHILD: MOVING TOWARD
UNIFORMITY IN ADOPTION LAW
Mara E. Selmann
Abstract: Adoption is governed by state law, which varies dramatically among states, and
thus encourages forum shopping and complicates interstate adoption. A new Uniform
Adoption Act (UAA), likely to be completed and approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1994, offers states the opportunity to move toward
greater uniformity. The UAA balances all of the participants' interests while keeping the
child's best interests foremost.
"Baby Jessica Case Scares Away Adoptive Parents... "Mother Files
to Bar Adoption by Gay Couple."'2 "Florida No Longer Discourages
Mixed Race Adoptions.. "Adults in Tug of War over Toddler: Dad
Fights Adoption by Ex-Lover's In-Law. ' 4 "'Unique' Adoption Ruling;
Both Sides Cheer Settlement that Shares Vt. Boy."'5  "Adoption Code
Needed. ' 6
As these recent newspaper headlines suggest, adoption is a complex
balancing act. The needs and interests of the biological parents, the
adoptive parents, the agency or attorney arranging the adoption, the state,
and, most importantly, the child are often in conflict.7 Most adoptions
are regulated by state law,' and one state may weigh the interests of the
participants differently than another.' Thus, the resolution of the
tensions among various interests depends largely on the state in which an
adoption takes place. This lack of uniformity encourages forum
shopping and creates problems in interstate adoption when parties must
comply with the laws of multiple states.'"
Achieving more uniform treatment of adoption cases requires, at a
minimum, more uniform adoption laws. Although previous attempts at
1. Melissa Fletcher Stoeltie, Houston Chron., Dec. 5, 1993, at Lifestyle 1.
2. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1993, at A14.
3. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 12, 1993, at 6A.
4. Jonathan Sidener, Ariz. Republic, Oct. 11, 1993, at Al.
5. Judith Gaines, Boston Globe, Aug. 21, 1993, at Metro/Region 1.
6. USA Today, Aug. 27, 1993, at 10A.
7. See infra Part H.
8. Joan H. Hollingeret al., Adoption Law and Practice § 1.01[l] (1988) [hereinafter Hollinger].
9. Id.
10. See infra Part II.A.
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creating uniformity in adoption law have largely failed,11 a new Uniform
Adoption Act (UAA) is now in the final draft stage and may be
completed as early as August 1994.12 The UAA contains many well
thought out provisions that every state should incorporate into its
adoption laws.
This Comment begins by briefly outlining the history of adoption law,
including previous attempts to create uniformity. Part II explores the
reasons for adoption law's complexity. Part III discusses the various
interests that must be balanced in adoption proceedings and suggests a
methodology for analyzing adoption law. Part IV examines present state
laws and the proposed UAA provisions governing three specific aspects
of adoption law that currently vary dramatically from state to state: 3 (1)
the procedure for obtaining consent and the time period within which
consent may be revoked, (2) policies of matching a child and adoptive
parents on the basis of race, and (3) open adoption. It also argues that
these provisions of the proposed UAA promote the best interests of the
child while providing an optimal balance of the other competing
interests. Part V recommends that every state adopt some or all of the
UAA in order to reduce forum shopping and the legal complications
involved in interstate adoptions.
I. THE HISTORY OF MODERN ADOPTION LAW: GUARDING
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Adoption originally entailed nothing more than an informal transfer of
a child. Today, detailed statutory arrangements create the full legal
relationship of parent and child. From the earliest statutes to the present,
adoption law has purportedly focused on "the best interests of the child,"
a standard that has also evolved and expanded over time.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. The Uniform Adoption Act will be considered by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the organization responsible for draffing the UAA and other
uniform acts, at its August convention. Telephone Interview with Joan Hollinger, Reporter for the
Uniform Adoption Act (April 4, 1994); Interview with Robert Aronson, Professor, University of
Washington School of Law, in Seattle, WA (Oct. 6, 1993) (Professor Aronson is one of
Washington's representatives to the NCCUSL.).
13. There are many other aspects of adoption that vary from state to state, such as the process for
terminating parental rights, the required notice to an unwed biological father, and the openness or
confidentiality of adoption records. The three aspects chosen for discussion in this Comment
illustrate the need for uniform adoption law that places the child's interests above all others.
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A. The Evolution ofAdoption Law
Modem American adoption law is entirely a creature of statute.14 In
the United States, adoption was handled by private legislative acts and
informal arrangements until 1851,"s when Massachusetts passed the first
adoption statute. 6 This statute contained specific requirements for
approving an adoption, including a judicial finding that the adopters were
"suitable" and that adoption would serve the "moral and temporal" or
best interests of the child. 7 Judges based their adoption decisions
primarily on economic rather than psychological concerns, inquiring into
little beyond the adoptive parents' financial solvency. 8 Background
checks and probationary periods were not part of the procedure and most
adoptions were completed in one day. 9
Every state's adoption statute now specifies that the standard for
making adoption determinations" is the best interests of the child.2' As
part of protecting the child's interests, states generally require a
background investigation of the adoptive parents by child welfare
professionals and a probationary period before an adoption is finalized.'
These safeguard procedures are relatively simple; the difficulty lies in
determining just exactly what a child's best interests are.
B. Defining the "Best Interests of the Child"
The best interests standard is nebulous and largely undefined.' Some
states list factors that may or may not be considered in making the
14. Hollinger, supra note 8, §1.02[1].
15. Id. §1.02[2].
16. 1851 Mass. Acts 324. See Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antecedents ofAmerican Adoption, The Future
of Children, Spring 1993, at 17, 18 (special issue on adoption); Hollinger, supra note 8, §1.0212].
17. Hollinger, supra note 8, § 1.0312].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. "Best interests of the child" is the standard employed at some phase in most child custody
determinations, including custody disputes between parents in a divorce and terminations of parental
rights. Thus, the law defining "best interests of the child" extends beyond adoption law. See, e.g.,
In re Petition of D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1322 (D.C. 1985) (noting that the best interests standard is
applicable to child custody disputes between spouses, between a natural parent and a foster parent,
and in child neglect proceedings, in addition to adoption).
21. Hollinger, supra note 8, § 1.01[2][b].
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., In re A.V.D., 62 Wash. App. 562, 572, 815 P.2d 277, 283 (1991) ("Washington
courts have held that the factors involved in determining the 'best interests' of a child are not capable
of specification; rather each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.").
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determination, such as race, religion, sexual orientation, family
relationship, or status as a foster parent,24 but states lack specific
guidelines for determining exactly what is in the child's best interests.'
Thus, many people have criticized the standard, not for its intent, but for
its indeterminacy. One author compared the statatory admonition to
decide in the child's best interests to telling the manager of a factory to
maximize output at the least cost.27 Neither provides much specificity.
One influential force in shaping child custody determinations,
including adoption, in the last 20 years has been a book entitled Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child.28 The authors point cut the artificiality of
suggesting that some "best" arrangement waits somewhere for the child,
and propose instead a framework for choosing the best of the
immediately available placement alternatives.29 This framework rests on
three basic ideas. First, children need continuity in their relationships,
surroundings, and environmental influences." Repeated disruption
causes developmental delays and damages a child's ability to form deep,
stable emotional attachments." Placement should reflect a child's need
to develop close, long-term bonds with a parental figure.32 Second,
24. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.255 (West 1992) (giving relatihes first priority in adoption,
followed by parents of the same racial or ethnic heritage); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45a-726a (West
Supp. 1994) (giving decision makers permission to consider the sexual orientation of adoptive
parents); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 911 (1993) (requiring placement to abide by natural parents
specification of religion, if any); N.J. Rev. Stat. Ann. §30:4C-26.7 (West 1981) (giving foster
parents who have had child for two continuous years preference and first consideration in adoption).
25. In custody determinations between biological parents, lists of comparative factors, such as
who has the stronger relationship with the child and who has been the primary caregiver are more
common. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.187(3)(a) (1992). Perhaps such lists are less common
in adoption because adoption is seldom a choice between two parental figures who have already
established relationships with the child.
26. See, e.g., Lucy Cooper & Patricia Nelson, Adoption and Termination Proceedings in
Wisconsin: A Reply Proposing Limiting Judicial Discretion, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 641, 643 (1983) ("The
problem with the best interest standard is that it has no content without urther definition"); Sanford
N. Katz, Foster Parents Versus Agencies: A Case Study in the Judic'al Application of 'The Best
Interests of the Child' Doctrine, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 145, 153 (1966) ("[The] doctrine has no absolute
definition. Nor is there uniformity in the results of the cases in which the doctrine has been
applied.').
27. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1975, at 226,255 (quoting Lon Fuller).
28. Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
(rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter Beyond the Best Interests] (originally published in 1973).
29. The authors call this the "least detrimental alternative." Id. at 53.
30. Id. at 31-32.
31. Id. at 32-33.
32. Id. at31.
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children perceive the passage of time differently than adults.33 While a
few months may seem like a relatively short time to an adult, to a small
child it is an eternity.3" The time frame for placement decisions should
take into account this difference in perception, and not exceed a child's
ability to withstand loss and uncertainty.3" Third, no one can predict with
absolute certainty the outcome of a particular placement.36 A child
suffers more harm from waiting for the "perfect" placement than from
moving immediately to a setting that provides at least a stable and loving
environment.37 Based on these three precepts, the authors conclude that
the child's need for a speedy and permanent arrangement should take
precedence over the interests of the various adults involved.38
Courts have cited Beyond the Best Interests of the Child in hundreds
of child custody cases,39 particularly when recognizing the child's need
for continuity of care. Courts now regularly consider psychological
factors in determining the child's best interests and strive to select from
the choices available rather than wait for a "best" placement.40 However,
despite this tightening focus on the best interests of the child, different
states still approach adoption quite differently.
II. THE COMPLEXITY OF ADOPTION LAW AND THE NEED
FOR UNIFORMITY
Adoption law is complicated because each state has developed its own
law to address the infinite variety of situations that occur in adoptions.
The resulting lack of uniformity among states' adoption laws creates
difficulties in coordinating interstate adoption and encourages forum
33. Id. at 40.
34. Id. at40-41.
35. Id. at 42.
36. Id. at 51.
37. Id. at 51-52.
38. Id. at62, 105-11.
39. A Lexis search of all state and federal case databases on June 10, 1994 located 236 cases
citing Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, including decisions in 47 states and two United States
Supreme Court decisions. In Bowen v. Gifiiard, the Supreme Court quoted the book for the principal
that "[c]ontinuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmental influence are essential for a
child's normal development." 483 U.S. 587, 623 (1987).
40. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Michelle Lee T., 117 Cal. Rptr. 856, 860 (Ct. App. 1975) ("The
question is not whether a particular set of circumstances is in the best interest of the child, but
whether a particular set of circumstances relative to an alternative set of circumstances is in the best
interests of the child."); In re Petition of D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1323 (D.C. 1985) (defining best
interests as the least detrimental alternative).
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shopping. So far, none of the attempted uniform or model adoption acts
has been particularly successful in facing the challenge of satisfying the
differing needs and interests of multiple states. However, the proposed
UAA may change that.
A. Causes of Complexity
Adoption law must address a broad spectrum of situations.4'
Regulations that may help in the adoption of an infant by unrelated
adults may unnecessarily hinder the adoption of a hard-to-place older
child. Intrafamily adoptions may allow or require more openness than
adoption by unrelated adults. Adoptions of foreign-born children and
Native American children raise challenging issues of national
sovereignty and cultural preservation that require other specific legal
protections.42 Any adoption law must be flexible enough to address each
of these different situations and yet detailed enough :o provide clear legal
guidance.
Furthermore, many different laws and jurisdictions regulate adoption.
Like most family law, adoption is governed primarily by state law.
Because of different priorities, needs, and values, states have developed
significantly different adoption laws.43 In addition, federal law governs
aspects of international, Native American, and special needs adoptions.'
41. See Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption Law, The Future of Children, Spring 1993, at 43, 44-45
(special issue on adoption) [hereinafter Hollinger, Adoption Law]. Approximately half of the over
100,000 adoptions taking place each year are intrafamily, either by stepparents or relatives. The
remaining half are unrelated adoptions which include adoptions of infants, adoptions of older
children and special needs children, and international adoptions. Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on
Adoption in the United States, The Future of Children, Spring 1993, at 26, 29 (citing The 1989
Adoption Factbook).
42. See, e.g., The Indian Child Welfare Act, infra note 44, at 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1988) (In
implementing tribal jurisdiction over child custody cases, Congress noted: "[T]he States, exercising
their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and
judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the
cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.'); Hague Convention on
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1134 (recognizing the importance of particular protections for intercountry adoption).
43. Hollinger, supra note 8, § 4.01[3].
44. Federal immigration and naturalization law applies to international adoptions. 8 U.S.C. §§
1101, 1151-1154, 1434 (1988), 8 C.F.R. § 204.1-.3 (1993). The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
gives Native American tribes jurisdiction over the adoption of many Native American children,
superseding applicable state law. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988). The Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Acts include guidelines and reimbursements for adoption of special needs children.
42 U.S.C. §§ 670-76 (1988). In addition, provisions in tax, welfare, and social security laws affect
aspects of adoptive relationships. See Hollinger, Adoption Law, supra note 41, at 45-46; Hollinger,
supra note 8, § 1.01.
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Modem trends make this mosaic of adoption laws particularly
troublesome. In our increasingly mobile society, interstate adoption is
more and more common. Sorting out which state's laws apply and
complying with the requirements of more than one state increases the
cost and time involved in adoption' The variation in adoption law
from state to state also encourages forum shopping. Adoptive parents
may go where they are most likely to find a child, satisfy the state's
standards for parental fitness, and acquire speedy termination of the birth
parents' rights. Birth mothers may go where they have the greatest say
in who adopts their child, where reimbursement for expenses is the
highest, or where a birth father's rights can be terminated with minimal
notice. The result is that some states become known as baby markets46
while others are avoided.47 Greater uniformity in adoption laws will
prevent such forum shopping."8
B. Attempts To Design Uniform Adoption Laws
Various bodies have attempted to create uniform adoption laws.49 The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
45. Mark T. McDermott, Agency Versus Independent Adoption: The Case for Independent
Adoption, The Future of Children, Spring 1993, at 146, 151 ("Because many independent adoptions
involve more than one state, the lack of uniformity leads to confusion, unnecessary delay, increased
expense, unanswerable questions, and varied interpretations.").
46. Texas, for example, has been called by some critics the "Texas Baby Train." This reputation
is due in part to having more licensed adoption agencies than either California or New York,
relatively unrestricted financial support for the birth mother, and irrevocable relinquishment of
parental rights. Joan M. Cheever, Lone Star State Legislators Prepare to Apply the Brakes on the
So-Called Baby Train, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 8.
47. One private adoption attorney commented, "Nobody likes to adopt in California," primarily
because of the length of time before adoptions are finalized and the ease with which the biological
parents can revoke their consent. Telephone Interview with Mark Demeray, Washington attorney
(Oct. 21, 1993).
48. Uniform adoption laws will not, by themselves, create complete uniformity. Interpretation of
the law will vary so long as judges are given broad discretion in deciding adoption cases, particularly
in applying the best interests standard. See supra, Part I.B. Many commentators have criticized the
best interests standard for permitting personal opinion and bias to shape the law. See, e.g., Cooper &
Nelson, supra note 26, at 643 ("It may become a mere facade behind which social workers, lawyers
and judges hide when making decisions based on intuition, personal likes and dislikes, armchair
psychology, and ideology so deeply rooted that the decision makers are unaware that it is mere
ideology."); Mnookin, supra note 27, at 263 (noting that the same case given to different judges may
easily result in different decisions). Although judicial discretion in determining the best interests of
the child is an interesting subject worthy of greater exploration, it is beyond the scope of this
Comment. Even though uniform adoption laws are not likely to be interpreted uniformly, they are at
least a significant step in the right direction.
49. Another possible approach is for the federal government to make federal funding for adoption
contingent on following a uniform law. To some extent, this is already happening in areas of
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(NCCUSL)," the federal government, and the American Bar Association
(ABA) have all in turn tried their hand at drafting proposed uniform acts.
None has gained significant approval.
In 1953 the NCCUSL and the ABA made the first attempt at creating
uniformity in adoption law by approving a Uniform Adoption Act,
revised in 1969 and amended in 1971." However, only a few relatively
unpopulous states ever approved any version of the act." While other
states have incorporated portions of the act or comparable provisions,53
the act failed to create any substantial uniformity.
Other bodies have attempted to draft complete uniform adoption laws,
but none has made it past the draft stage. 4 In 1979, the Model Adoption
Legislation and Procedures Advisory Panel"5 submitted a Model State
Adoption Act with Commentary 6 to the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The Secretary ultimately
rejected the panel's proposal, 7 offering instead the more modest Model
Act for the Adoption of Children with Special Need-s." The Family Law
adoption, such as special needs adoption. See, e.g., The Adoption Assislance and Child Welfare Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 670-76 (1988).
50. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is a nonprofit
organization composed of judges, lawyers, law professors, and state legislators appointed by the
governors of every state. The NCCUSL's purpose is to draft proposed uniform legislation on a
variety of topics subject to legislative authority. See Hollinger, Adoption Law, supra note 41, at 46
and 57 n.14.
51. Unif. Adoption Act, 9 U.L.A. 11 (rev. 1971).
52. Hollinger, supra note 8, Appendb 4-A (Supp. 1992). NCCUSL Lpproval of the 1971 Revised
Uniform Adoption Act has been withdrawn pending consideration of the new proposed Uniform
Adoption Act. Id.
53. Hollinger, supra note 8, § 4.01[3].
54. Other acts have been more successful in addressing particular aspects of adoption. The
Uniform Parentage Act, substantially adopted by eighteen states, attempts to clarify the legal status
of married and unmarried parents in all types of custody disputes, including adoption proceedings.
9B U.L.A. 295 (1979). The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, accepted by every
state, provides protection for placing children across state lines. Hollinger, supra note 8, § 3-A.03.
Unfortunately, bureaucratic hassles and delays have made it less than entirely effective. Id. § 3-A.08
(Supp. 1992) (citing criticism from state courts).
55. Joseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, appointed the panel to give
special interest groups a forum for discussing and resolving their interests. Hollinger, supra note 8,
§ 4.01[3] n.23.
56. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,622 (1980).
57. Hollinger, supra note 8, § 4.01[3].
58. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,022 (1981).
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section of the ABA also spent the 1980s drafting a Model State Adoption
Act,59 but it never won ABA approval.'
In the most recent effort, a committee of the NCCUSL spent the last
several years drafting an entirely new Uniform Adoption Act (UAA).
The committee sought advice from many interested groups,6 including
the ABA drafters,62 in an effort to create a widely acceptable act. The
UAA may gain NCCUSL approval as early as August 1994, at which
time the Commission will offer it to the states.63
The UAA faces significant challenges. First, it must avoid the pitfalls
of previous uniform acts, particularly the danger of catering heavily to
one interest group.' Furthermore, it must overcome each state's
resistance to changing its laws.65 Moral perspectives on family issues are
not consistent throughout the country, making it difficult to pass a
uniform law on such a sensitive topic as adoption. Finally, in order for a
uniform adoption law to succeed, it must take into account the
multiplicity of competing interests involved. Despite the considerable
challenges to be faced, the significant benefits of uniformity66 make any
step in that direction valuable.
59. Draft ABA Model State Adoption Act, 19 Fam. L.Q. 105 (1985).
60. Hollinger, Adoption Law, supra note 41, at 46.
61. Organizations interested in different adoption issues attend the drafting committee meetings
and advocate their positions. Carol McHugh, Experts: Adoptions Contests Not Common-But Risks
Are, Chicago Daily L. Bull., Aug. 30, 1993, at 3.
62. Hollinger, Adoption Law, supra note 41, at 46.
63. See supra note 12. Three states have already considered or are considering large portions of
the proposed UAA and several other state legislatures have requested copies of the proposed statute.
McHugh, supra note 61 (discussing interview with Joan Hollinger, reporter for the UAA drafting
committee).
64. For example, the Model State Adoption Act with Commentary submitted to the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, severely curtailed private attorneys' involvement in adoption. 45
Fed. Reg. 10622, 10627 (1980). This led to opposition by the ABA. See Dee Samuels, Preface to
the Model Adoption Act, 19 Fam. L.Q. 103 (1985). In turn, when the Family Law Section of the
ABA proposed their model state adoption act, some criticized it for not regulating private attorneys
enough. See, e.g., Michele Galen, Baby Brokers; How Far Can a Lawyer Go? Nat'l U., Feb. 9,
1987, at 1 (discussing criticism of inadequate regulation).
65. Hollinger, supra note 8, § 4.01t3]. As a further complication, states with highly developed
adoption laws are likely to resist adopting a "common denominator" uniform law. Id.
66. See supra Part l.A.
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III. BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF ADOPTION
PARTICIPANTS
There are many competing and complementary interests involved in
every adoption. While some adoption literature refers to "the adoption
triangle"'67 and a few authors even recognize "the adoption rectangle,"68
in reality, there are at least five interests operating. The child, the
biological parents, the adoptive parents, the agency or attorney arranging
the adoption, and the state all have a considerable stake in the adoption. 9
While all of these parties' interests merit consideration, the most
important factor should be the best interests of the child.
Biological parents are interested in having some control over the
decision whether adoption is their best option. The biological mother
and father may or may not have common interests. 7They may be unified
in the decision to give up their child or they may have distinctly
divergent opinions about the adoption.7" One biological parent may even
be attempting to have the other's parental rights terminated so that a
stepparent adoption can take place." The biological parents also may
have differing ideas about the type of adoption that will work best for
them, whether speedy or drawn out, through an agency or arranged
privately. Some may want complete confidentiality -while others want to
personally choose the adoptive parents or remain in contact with their
children.72
67. See, e.g., A. Sorosky et al., The Adoption Triangle (1978) (recognizing the adoptive parents,
the biological parents, and the child).
68. See P. Sachdev, Unlocking the Adoption Files (1989) (adding the agency as a fourth
participant); Marianne Berry, Risks and Benefits of Open Adoption, The Future of Children, Spring
1993, at 125, 135 (same).
69. See, e.g., In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 806, 586 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1978) (suggesting that
the court must be sensitive to the interests of the natural parents, the adoptive parents, and the state,
as well as the child).
70. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Girl K., 26 Wash. App. 897, 615 P.2d 1310 (1980) (noting
that father resisted mother's petition to revoke her written surrender of the child); Michael K.
McIntyre, Mother Says Baby Better Off.Adopted, Plain Dealer, Nov. 23, 1993, at lB (discussing case
in which mother lied about father's identity, claiming to have been raped at a party, to avoid
obtaining consent from estranged husband.) Many biological mothers attempt to prevent biological
fathers from having any role in the adoption. However, these efforts to exclude the biological father,
along with other forms of involuntary termination of parental rights, tire a sensitive and complex
subject that is beyond the scope of this Comment.
71. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981) (denying father's and stepmother's petition
to have mother's parental rights terminated so stepmother could adopt child).
72. See Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, Perspectives on Oper, Adoption, The Future of
Children, Spring 1993, at 119, 122. Berry, supra note 68, at 129.
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Adoptive parents are primarily interested in finding a child. For some,
a child with particular characteristics may be important, while for others,
the child's race or age is a significantly secondary consideration to
simply finding a child.73 Adoptive parents generally want to avoid long
delays in the adoption process. They typically want reassurance that they
have received all the facts about the child they are adopting.74 Adoptive
parents also desire finality as soon as possible because their developing
relationship with the child suffers while the potential exists for a
biological parent to change his or her mind.75
The agency or attorney arranging the adoption also has an agenda. In
addition to the financial incentives inherent in being paid for their
services, many agencies and attorneys hold particular religious or
political beliefs that affect the types of placements they make.76 Some
attorneys and agencies placing children for adoption want careful
regulation of adoption,77 while others resent any government interference
in what they feel should be a completely private transaction.78
The state has two distinctly different interests in adoption
proceedings.79 First, it is responsible for acting as parens patrie0 for the
73. See, e.g., Florida No Longer Discourages Mixed-Race Adoptions, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Dec. 12, 1993, at 6A (relating story of a family whose request to adopt a thirteen-year-old friend of
their adopted son was denied solely because of racial differences).
74. See, e.g., M.H. v. Caritas Family Services, 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992) (permitting
negligent misrepresentation action against agency based on agency's failure to disclose incest and
child health problems in child's background); Adoption Agency Settles, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 1, 1993, at 6
(describing settlement agreement in which adoption agency paid over $1 million in damages for
failing to provide medical information about two adopted children).
75. See Beyond the Best Interests, supra note 28, at 35-36.
76. Some religiously affiliated adoption agencies will place children only with adoptive parents of
the same faith. See, e.g., Scott v. Family Ministries, 135 Cal. Rptr. 430 (App. 1976) (rejecting
agency rule allowing Cambodian children to be placed only with members of evangelical Protestant
sects). Many agencies and caseworkers refuse to make transracial placements. See, e.g., Arnold R.
Silverman, Outcomes of Transracial Adoptions, The Future of Children, Spring 1993, at 104,
105-106 (explaining the National Association of Black Social Workers' vehement opposition to
transracial adoption).
77. L. Jean Emery, Agency Versus Independent Adoption: The Case for Agency Adoption, The
Future of Children, Spring 1993, at 139, 140 (voicing opinion of the Child Welfare League of
America that independent adoption should be more carefully regulated, if not eliminated).
78. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Forum: Adoption and Market Theory: The Regulation of the
Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 59 (1987) (advocating a free market for adoption).
79. Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (suggesting in the context of termination
proceedings that the state has a interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a
fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings).
80. "Parent of the country." The term refers traditionally to the role of state as sovereign and
guardian of persons under legal disability. Black's Law Dictionary 414 (6th ed. 1990).
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child, protecting the child's welfare and seeking a solution that best
meets that child's needs.8' Second, the state has an interest in the
efficient administration of adoptions. The state passes laws regulating
adoption; funds various aspects of adoption, such as subsidizing special
needs adoptions 2 and foster care preceding adoption; and provides the
court system to approve adoptions.
Finally, the child has the most important stake in adoption. Children
need safe, loving homes that meet their psychological as well as physical
needs. They need speedy determinations that reflect a child's sense of
time, and protection from disruption of established emotional bonds. 3
Every state (and the UAA 4) at least theoretically recognizes the child's
overriding interest by its use of the "best interests of the child" standard
in determining adoption outcomes. 5 Meeting the child's needs furthers
society's interests as well. Healthy, well-adjusted children are more
likely to do well in school and engage in socially appropriate behavior.
8 6
They are also more likely to be good parents as adults. 7
Adoption legislation should respect the heeds of every participant in
an adoption. Granted, this is a lot to ask from a piece of legislation.
However, while meeting every participant's interests fully is impossible,
a careful balancing of all the interests, with the focus always on the
child's best interests, should lead to a workable adoption law.
IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT-A
CAREFUL BALANCING OF INTERESTS
Although the UAA contains many provisions worthy of discussion,
this Comment analyzes only three that concern aspects of adoption that
vary dramatically from state to state: the procedure for obtaining consent,
racial matching policies, and open adoption. The UAA addresses each of
81. See, e.g., Care and Protection of Robert, 556 N.E.2d 993, 1000 (Mass. 1990) ("The
Commonwealth, as parens pattie, has a strong interest in the welfare of the children of the
Commonwealth.")
82. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:1790 (West Supp. 1994); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19 § 541
(West Supp. 1993); Wash. Rev. Code § 74.13.109 (1992).
83. David M. Brodzinsky, Long-term Outcomes in Adoption, The Future of Children, Spring
1993, at 153, 159 (reporting studies that indicate children who expcrience multiple changes in
caretaking environments before adoption are more likely to experience adjustment difficulties).
84. Unif. Adoption Act (March 16, 1994 draft) [hereinafter UAA] § 3-703(a) ("A court shall grant
the petition for adoption if it determines that the adoption will be in the best interest of the minor.").
85. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
86. Brodzinsky, supra note 83, at 156.
87. See Beyond the Best Interests, supra note 28, at 7.
Vol. 69:841, 1994
Uniformity in Adoption Law
these areas with provisions that consider the interests of all the parties
involved while maintaining the ultimate focus on the best interests of the
child.
A. Consent and Revocation of Consent
State laws vary dramatically in the types of safeguards they employ to
ensure that the biological parents' decision to relinquish their child is
informed and voluntary.88 Taking the best pieces of these state laws, the
UAA provides substantial safeguards while facilitating a fairly speedy
termination of parental rights.
1. Current State Law
Specific areas of variance among state laws include the procedures for
obtaining consent, the time period (if any) during which consent can be
freely revoked, and the test used for determining if a later revocation of
consent will be permitted. Every state insists, either by statute or case
law, that a mother cannot give irrevocable consent to the adoption of her
child before it is born.89 A few states allow formal consent to be
executed at any time, including before the child's birth,90 but permit
revocation of consent within a short time afterwards. The majority of
states, however, do not allow consent to be given before the child's
birth.92 This safeguard probably derives from the view that a mother
88. Consent is not required if the court has determined that the parent has abandoned the child by
failing to provide sufficient care or the state has intervened to terminate the parent's rights. See, e.g.
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24 (West 1992); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.415 (West 1987). In many states, if an
alleged father has been given notice of the pending adoption and does not appear to contest it, his
parental rights may be terminated. See, eg., Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.120(3) (1992).
89. Hollinger, supra note 8, § 2.11[1][a]. Consent is also, of course, a necessary element of the
adoption of an older child. However the timing of such a consent is much less critical. See id.
90. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15A-26-10A-13 (1992); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.080(3) (1992); see
also Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-61 (1993) (allowing consent to be given following the sixth month of
pregnancy).
91. See, e.g., Ala. Code §15A-26-IOA-13 (1992) (allowing consent to be withdrawn for a limited
time after the birth if the court finds that it is in the child's best interests); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 578-8
(1993) (not permitting judgment to be entered until after the birth of the child and allowing consent
to be withdrawn until the child is placed with the prospective adopters); Wash. Rev. Code §
26.33.110 (1992) (permitting revocation of consent until a judicial hearing is held, which cannot be
held within 48 hours of the child's birth).
92. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-107(B) (1989) (no sooner than 72 hours after birth); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45a-17 (not within first 48 hours after birth); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 750 § 50/9 (Smith-
Hurd 1993) (not less than 72 hours after birth); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9.422.7 (no sooner than the
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cannot fully understand the significance of relinquishing her child until
she has actually experienced giving birth.93 Some states have more
relaxed rules regarding the father's consent, permitting a father to give
his consent, which may be irrevocable, before the birth of the child.94
Some states require a parent who is a minor95 to obtain the consent of a
parent or guardian,96 or to consult with counsel or an appointed guardian
ad litem. 9
7
The standards and period for revoking consent to an adoption vary
between states. Some states permit revocation for any reason within a
few days of giving consent.98 Unqualified revocation is more likely to be
permitted for consents witnessed by lay persons than for judicially
witnessed consents.99 The reasons required for revocation after those few
days have elapsed vary, with some states allowing revocation based only
on fraud or duress, and others allowing it if withdrawal is reasonable
fifth day after birth); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24 (West 1992) (any time after birth); Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 15.03(a) (West 1986) (after birth).
93. See Hollinger, supra note 8, § 2.1 l[l][a].
94. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 750 §§ 50/9, 50110, 50/12a (Smith-Hurd 1993) (permitting consent
at any time but allowing revocation within 72 hours of child's birth); Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 15.041
(West 1986 and Supp. 1994) (allowing irrevocable consent before the child's birth). While based on
the practical consideration that the father may disappear before the child's birth, statutes that treat the
mother and father differently may raise constitutional questions. Hollinger, supra note 8, §
2.1 1[l][b].
95. Consent is not generally voidable simply because the parent is a minor. See, e.g., Cal. Fam.
Code § 8814 (West Supp. 1994) (minority of parent does not invalidate consent); Ill. Stat. Ann. §
50/11 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (consent not voidable because of minority).
96. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 710.28(2), 710.43(4) iWest 1993) (if parent is
unemancipated minor, then the parent's parents, guardian, or guardian ad litem must also execute
release).
97. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.070 (1992) (court will appoint guardian ad litem for parent
who is a minor to help assess whether consent was informed and voluntary).
98. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 25.23.070 (1991) (permitting consent to be revoked for any reason
within ten days after consent executed, and up until time of final decree if revocation is in the child's
best interests).
99. Compare, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 25.23.070 (1991) (permitting lay-witnessed consent to be
revoked for any reason within ten days after consent executed, and up until time of final decree if
revocation is in the child's best interests) with Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.160 (1992) (making consent
irrevocable once court approves consent, although consent is revocable for up to one year upon a
showing of fraud, duress or lack of mental capacity).
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under the circumstances and in the best interests of the child."t
Revocation for one of these reasons may be permitted for many months
or until the adoption is finalized.'0 ' Thus, in some states adoptive parents
can be quite sure after a couple of days that the child is now theirs, while,
in others, adoptive parents may wait months before being sure that the
biological parents will not take the child back.
2. The UAA Approach
The UAA takes a middle-of-the-road approach.'0 2 As in the majority
of states currently, neither the mother nor the father may consent before
the birth of the child. 3 The witness to the consent, who may not be the
lawyer representing the adoptive parents or an agency employee,' must
certify that the contents and consequences of giving the consent were
explained, and that he or she believed that the parent read, understood,
and signed the consent voluntarily. 5 A parent who is a minor must have
had independent legal counsel."°
Consent given within 72 hours of the child's birth may be revoked for
any reason within 120 hours after its execution.0 7 Consent may also be
revoked anytime before a final decree of adoption is entered if the
individual who executed the consent establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that it was obtained by fraud or duress.'
100. Compare, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-106(E) (1989) (disallowing revocation of consent
unless consent obtained by fraud or duress) and Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.160 (1992) (permitting
revocation of court approved consent within one year upon showing fraud, duress, or lack of mental
capacity) with Alaska Stat. § 25.23.070 (1991) (allowing revocation until adoption decree is final if
in the child's best interests).
101. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 25.23.070 (1991) (allowing revocation until adoption decree is final
if in the child's best interests); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.160 (1992) (permitting revocation of court
approved consent within one year upon showing fraud, duress, or lack of mental capacity).
102. The UAA requires "consent" to an adoption and "relinquishment" to an agency which then
has the right to consent to adoption. The procedures for "consent" and "relinquishment" are similar,
so they have been treated together under the heading of consent here.
103. UAA § 2-404(a).
104. Id. § 2-405(a)(3), (4)
105. Id. § 2-405(d).
106. Id. § 2-405(c).
107. Id. §§ 2-404(a), 2-408(a)(1)
108. Id. § 2-408(b)(1).
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3. The UAA Provides Speedy Permanent Placement with Safeguards
To Protect All the Participants
The UAA's particular combination of safeguards provides optimal
balancing of all the participants' interests and needs, while also ensuring
the fairly speedy permanent placement of the child. A fully voluntary
and informed consent that will not be challenged later through fraud or
duress claims provides the greatest stability for everyone.
The UAA wisely follows the majority of states in not allowing parents
to consent to the adoption of their child before the birth. What may
previously have been a life complication becomes, at birth, a human
being to whom the parents have a connection. Allowing revocation of
consent for any reason for five days after the birth furthers the goal of
obtaining truly informed consent. The birth mother will have recovered
from the immediate pain, exhaustion, and often, sedation, of labor, and
both birth parents will have had time to rethink before being bound by
their decision. The UAA's requirement that a disinterested person
witness and explain the consent helps ensure that the biological parents
are fully aware of the consequences of executing a consent. The UAA's
focus on voluntary and informed consent decreases the chance that a
biological parent will later challenge the adoption based on fraud or
duress.
Allowing biological parents an extended period of time in which to
revoke their consent for less than fraud or duress threatens the security of
the adoptive parents and child and leaves the child it. limbo."°9 Adoptive
parents may distance themselves from the child until they are sure that it
is truly theirs."' Or, when the adoptive parents have become attached to
the child, they may engage in desperate legal tactics in an effort to hang
onto "their" child, although the law is on the biological parents' side."'
The UAA's provision not permitting an agency's or adoptive parents'
attorney to witness the execution of a consent to adoption protects the
agency or attorney.' 2 The birth parents are not pressured by the agency
109. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670, 675 (D.C. 1993) (describing child's uncertain
status in the family and family members' feelings of being under threat due to the delayed adoption).
110. Beyond the Best Interests, supra note 28, at 35.
111. See, e.g., In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). widely known as the Baby Jessica
case, the adoptive parents knew that the biological parents wanted their baby back within days of the
baby being placed in their home, but fought to keep the child through numerous courts in two
different states over a period of 29 months. Michelle Ingrassia & Karn Springin, She's Not Baby
Jessica Anymore, Newsweek, Mar. 21, 1994, at 60.
112. Hollinger, supra note 8, § 2.11[2].
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or adoptive parents' attorney into giving their consent; nor is there the
appearance of their having been pressured. Ensuring that the process
appears fair will likely reduce the effectiveness of unfounded claims that
consent was obtained by fraud or duress. Safeguarding the process of
giving consent to ensure that a biological parent fully understands the
consent also reduces the chance of a later successful revocation. Because
agencies and attorneys want their clients to be happy with adoption
arrangements, it serves their interests to ensure that consent was freely
and properly given in the first place in order to avoid messy appeals.
The state's interests in protecting the child's welfare and minimizing
the cost to the state are not well-served by lengthy appeals and children
waiting in foster care. Thus, the state benefits financially from the UAA
provisions ensuring that consents are quickly and fairly obtained. At the
same time, the state fulfills its role of guarding the child's needs.
Finally and most importantly, a process that protects the interests of
the child protects everyone's interests. In ensuring that consent is
informed and voluntary, the UAA places emphasis on the way in which
consent is obtained rather than on a lengthy time period in which
biological parents may change their minds. This protects the child by
minimizing the delay in permanent placement. By limiting later
revocation of consent to situations involving fraud or duress and
permitting revocations only until the adoption is finalized, the UAA
reduces the prospect of moving the child again. The UAA provisions on
consent respect the child's sense of time by making quick permanent
arrangements, and protect the child's interest in continuity of care by not
risking switching the child between homes. While addressing the
interests of all the other participants, the consent provisions protect the
child first and foremost.
B. Racial Matching Policies
The importance of matching adoptive parents and children based on
their race has been a hotly debated subject for decades." 3 Some states
explicitly encourage racial matching, while others freely permit
transracial adoption. The UAA more closely follows the second group of
states by not permitting race to be the sole factor in denying or delaying
placement.
113. Although many international adoptions are transracial, this section focuses on domestic
adoption.
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1. Current State Law
Many state statutes permit or require an attempt to match a child's and
adoptive parents' racial or ethnic backgrounds,'1 4 and agencies often
carry this policy even further."' Proponents of racial matching base the
policy on a desire to preserve the ethnic and cultural heritage of a child.
In one notable example, the National Association of Black Social
Workers passed a resolution in 1972 opposing the: adoption of black
children by anyone other than blacks which led to a dramatic drop-off in
transracial adoptions." 6 It argued that black children must remain
physically, psychologically, and culturally in black families in order to
develop a total sense of themselves, and decried transracial placement as
cultural genocide." 7 Similarly, vigorous opposition ftom tribal leaders to
the significant number of Native American children being placed for
adoption with white families led Congress to pass the Indian Child
Welfare Act" 8 in 1978. The Act places child custody matters, including
adoption, under tribal jurisdiction and makes adoption by anyone other
than a member of a child's tribe extremely difficult." 9 States are
constitutionally permitted to consider race as a relevant, but not
determinative, factor in adoption decisions. 20 However, state laws going
114. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.255 (West 1992) (stating that the best interests of the child
are met by requiring due, not sole, consideration of the child's race or ethnic heritage in adoption
placements and setting out a placement hierarchy which only the biological parents can override
consistent with the child's best interests: first relatives, then persons with the same racial or ethnic
heritage, and finally persons of a different racial or ethnic heritage who are knowledgeable and
appreciative of the child's racial or ethnic heritage); Cal. Fam. Code § 8708 (West Supp. 1994)
(requiring 90 day effort to place child with a relative first, and then with a family of the same racial
or ethnic background).
115. In practice, many agencies avoid transracial placements. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton
County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs., 547 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 US.
910 (1978) (describing agency efforts to avoid placing black child with his white foster parents);
Valerie Finholm, Transracial Adoptee Describes Hardships; Adoption Between the Race at Issue;
One Life in Search of Cultural Identity, The Hartford Courant, Jan. 31, 1994, at Al (quoting
adoption case worker as being proud of never having made a transracial placement in her ten years
as a caseworker); An Outrageous Racial Standard, L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1993 at M4 (describing how
California child welfare agencies often preemptively deny requests for transracial adoption).
116. Silverman, supra note 76, at 105-106.
117. Id. at 106.
118. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988).
119. Silverman, supra note 76, at 107. The UAA defers to the Indian Child Welfare Act
whenever the two statutes are inconsistent. UAA § 1-107. While the goal of increasing uniformity
is important, issues of tribal sovereignty play a unique role in the adoption of Native American
children.
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to the extreme of absolutely prohibiting transracial adoption have been
found to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
21
Despite the arguments in favor of racial matching, the increasing trend
among states is to move away from strict matching policies. Recently
both Florida and Texas abandoned racial matching policies and now
permit racial matching only if it will not delay placement."2 The move
toward transracial placement is largely prompted by the large number of
minority children, particularly black children, waiting in foster care for
adoptive homes."n There are simply not enough minority homes to meet
the need at this point.'24
While most people seem to agree that placing a child with a family of
the same racial or ethnic heritage best promotes the child's development
of racial or ethnic identity,"s there is little consensus on what to do when
not enough minority homes are immediately available. Proponents of
transracial adoption say that the child should be placed in an otherwise
120. See, e.g., DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("Because of the
potential difficulties inherent in a trans-racial adoption, a state agency may consider race and racial
attitudes in assessing prospective adoptive parents.")
121. See, e.g., Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 267 (E.D. La. 1972) (declaring
unconstitutional a Louisiana statute prohibiting interracial adoption); In re Adoption of Gomez, 424
S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (holding that a Texas statute forbidding a white to adopt a black
child and a black to adopt a white child violated the Equal Protection Clause).
122. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 16.081 (West Supp. 1994) ("[T~he court may not deny or delay
placement of a child for adoption or otherwise discriminate on the basis of the race or ethnicity of
the child or prospective adoptive parents.'); Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 47.041 (West Supp. 1994)
(requiring same criteria to be used by persons arranging adoptions).
123. See, e.g., Robbie Morganfield, Adoption Program Resurrected; Aim is to Place More Black
Kids, Houston Chron., Jan. 23, 1994, at Cl (stating that one-third of the children waiting to be
adopted in Texas are black); The Racial Divide in Adoption, Chicago Trib., Jan. 3, 1994, at 10
(claiming that black children make up 75% of the children in substitute care in Illinois); Cynthia
Tucker, A Case for Adoption Across Racial Lines, S.F. Chron., Nov. 26, 1993, at A25 (citing
statistics from the Child Welfare League of America that of the 20,000 children awaiting permanent
homes, 47% are white, 42% are black, 7% are Latino, and the rest are of other ethnic and racial
groups).
124. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 123 (noting that African-Americans, for example, make up only
12% of the population and tend to be less affluent, making them less likely to adopt, while the
percentage of African-American children awaiting adoption is much higher).
125. See, e.g., id. (arguing for transracial adoptions, but acknowledging that, under ideal
circumstances, children would be better off with parents of the same color and ethnic origin);
Maureen McCauley Evans, Love that Crosses Colors; Interracial Adoptions Bring Special
Challenges but Many Kids Thrive, Star Trib., Jan. 31, 1994, at 1E (quoting Rita Simon of American
University in Washington, D.C., whose 20 years of research support use of transracial adoption, as
saying she "never argued that transracial adoption is better than same-race adoption").
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suitable available home.126 Opponents argue that stendards for adoptive
parents need to be changed and more minority adoptive parents
recruited. 27 Finding a balance between these positions is a challenge.
2. The UAA Approach
Under the UAA, placement by an agency 121 is based on a hierarchy
among individuals with favorable pre-placement evaluations: 29 (1) an
individual selected by the biological parents if the agency allows the
biological parents to choose; (2) an individual who has adopted a sibling
of the child; (3) an individual with characteristics requested by a
biological parent, if the agency agrees to comply with the request and
locates the individual within a stated time period; (4) an individual who
has had physical custody of the child for six or more of the preceding 24
months or half the child's life, whichever is less, unless contrary to the
best interests of the child; (5) any other person having a favorable pre-
placement evaluation. 3 A minor's placement may not be denied or
delayed solely on the basis of the minor's race, national origin, or ethnic
background."' Agencies are required to make a diligent search for and
actively recruit prospective adoptive parents who are interested in and
capable of adopting minors who are difficult to place for a variety of
reasons, including their racial or ethnic background.'
3. The UAA Places Speedy, Permanent Placement Above Racial
Matching
The UAA allows an agency to match a child with parents on the basis
of race so long as there is no delay in the placement (except in the case of
a brief delay to accommodate a biological parent's specific request).
This policy is supported by studies finding that delay of placement is a
126. For an eloquent argument in favor of tansracial adoption, see Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do
Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1163 (1991).
127. See, e.g., id. at 1202 (explaining position of transracial adoption critics); Morganfield, supra
note 123, (discussing contention of the National Association of Black Social Workers that the
system sometimes makes it difficult for black families to qualify for adoption).
128. In independent adoptions, the adoptive parents are chosen directly by the biological parents
so no statutory criteria for placing the child apply.
129. The prospective adoptive parents must have a favorable pre-placement evaluation and the
placement must be in the best interests of the child in order to be approvAd. UAA § 2-104(a).
130. UAA § 2-104(a).
131. Id. § 2-104(b).
132. Id. § 2-105.
860
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much more prominent reason for problems experienced by adopted
children than transracial placement.
33
Biological parents may or may not participate in the decision whether
to place a child transracially. Any interest the biological parents have in
the race of the adoptive family is addressed by prioritizing the biological
parents' choice of the adoptive parents or the characteristics of the
adoptive parents. For the many minority children already freed for
adoption and waiting in alternative care, there are no biological parents
to express a preference.
Many adoptive parents simply want a child and are willing to adopt a
child from a different racial or cultural background. The UAA in no way
prevents adoptive parents from choosing to adopt a child of their own
race or ethnic heritage. However, when an adoptive parent of the same
race or ethnic heritage as the child is not immediately available, adoptive
parents of other backgrounds are permitted to adopt that child. The
UAA's provision giving long-term foster parents higher priority than a
stranger is particularly important because many children are placed in
foster care transracially. By allowing these foster parents to adopt
despite the difference in race, the child's interest in continuity of care is
protected.
Agencies may racially match as long as prospective adoptive parents
of the same racial or ethnic heritage are available. The agencies are only
restricted if a relative, stepparent, or foster parent of a different race
wants to adopt or if no matching adoptive families are currently
available. However, an agency's desire to racially match foster parents
and place a child with racially matching relatives in no way contradicts
the UAA's provisions. The UAA recognizes the importance of
continuing to search for minority families by requiring agencies to
diligently search for and recruit prospective adoptive parents for children
who are difficult to place for a variety of reasons, including their racial or
ethnic backgrounds.
The state benefits both administratively and as parens patrie from the
UAA hierarchy. The state financially benefits when minority children
133. A twelve-year longitudinal study of transtacial adoptions by Simon and Alstein, found that
many more of the serious problems in adoptions were attributable to problems present at the time of
placement in older children than to race. Silverman, supra note 76, at 113. Similarly, a study of
black and Asian transracial adoptions by Feigelman found that although racial hostility had a
negative impact on adjustment, delay in placement had a far greater impact Id. at 115. See also,
Hollinger, Adoption Law, supra note 41, at 48-49 (stating that research indicates the most salient
factors in achieving a successfiul adoption are the child's age and medical and social history at
placement, and not the racial, ethnic, or religious characteristics of the adoptive parents).
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are placed in adoptive homes rather than left in group homes or foster
care at state expense. The state also protects the child's welfare by
placing the child's interest in finding a home above a policy favoring
racial matching. Although the child's racial or ethnic identity may be
affected by a transracial placement, the effect is less serious than the
damage caused by delayed or multiple placements. 3"
Studies show that transracially and inracially"5 adopted children have
similar levels of academic achievement, self-esteem, and satisfaction
with their families.'36 Some studies found differences in feelings about
racial identity, but the researchers attributed a child's development of
racial or ethnic identity primarily to the way in which the adoptive
parents handled the issue.137  Troughout the studies, researchers
attributed most of the problem placements to factors such as older age at
time of placement rather than to the difference in race between parents
and child."3 8 The child's interests are met by the UAA hierarchy because
it emphasizes continuity of care and speedy placement whenever those
principles conflict with racial matching, but otherwi;e allows race to be a
factor considered in the best interests determination.
C. Open Adoption
Open adoption entails the sharing of information between adoptive
parents and biological relatives or ongoing contact by the child's
biological relatives with an adopted child. The term encompasses
everything from short-term to life-long contact, from the sharing of
occasional photographs or letters to regular visitation.39 As used here,
open adoption refers to an arrangement for future contact made at the
time of the adoption rather than later efforts to obtain information or
make contact. The UAA, recognizing that the law in this area is
undeveloped and highly controversial, permits open adoption
134. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
135. Inracial adoption refers to adoption by parents of the same race as the child.
136. See Silverman, supra note 76 (reporting results of various studies of transracial adoption
placements); Tucker, supra note 123 (citing a twenty-year study of transracial adoptions recently
completed by Rita Simon and Howard Alstein).
137. Silverman, supra note 76, at 110 (discussing research done by McRoy and Zurcher), 114
(citing study by Simon and Alstein).
138. Id. at 113 (citing study by Simon and Alstein), 115 (citing study by Feigelman and
Silverman).
139. See Berry, supra note 68, at 126.
Vol. 69:841, 1994
Uniformity in Adoption Law
arrangements but contains no specific enforcement provisions except in
the case of stepparent adoption.
1. Current State Law
Although many commentators have advocated open adoption in
recent years, 40 Washington state is the only state with a statutory
provision allowing an agreement for continuing contact between the
child and the birth parents to be part of the court order for adoption.14 '
Other states have judicially recognized such agreements through
visitation statutes permitting visitation with anyone when it would be in
the child's best interests. Under the Washington law, breach of the
agreement concerning future contact and communication does not affect
the validity of an adoption or undermine the voluntariness of a biological
parent's consent to the adoption, but civil remedies are available." In
other states, agreements are not judicially enforceable, but adoptive
parents may agree to ongoing contact with the birth parents.'" In some
states, however, even a completely voluntary agreement is not permitted
and adoption terminates any contact with a child's birth family.
45
Regardless of state law, many adoptions do include contact between the
biological and adoptive parents before the child's birth and during and
after the adoption proceedings. However, a contract for future contact
that has not been judicially recognized is not enforceable in the courts. 46
2. The UAA Approach
The UAA permits adoptive parents and biological parents to agree to
an open adoption. However, it provides an express enforcement
140. See, e.g., Baran & Pannor, supra note 72; Berry, supra note 68; Judy E. Nathan, Note,
Visitation After Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 633 (1984).
141. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.295 (1992).
142. See, e.g., Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738, 742 (Conn. 1988).
143. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.295(3), (4) (1992).
144. See, e.g., In re Gregory B., 542 N.E.2d 1052 (N.Y. 1989) (noting that adoptive parents are
free, at their election, to permit ongoing contact, but stating that the court could not make adoption
contingent on such an agreement).
145. See, e.g., Cage v. Harrisonburg Dep't of Social Servs., 410 S.E.2d 405 (Va. Ct. App. 1991)
(ruling that a voluntary open adoption agreement, performable at the discretion of the adoptive
parents, conflicts with statutory provision that the child becomes "for all intents and purposes" the
child of the adoptive parents).
146. Just as, for example, divorcing parents cannot enforce a contract concerning custody or
visitation that has not receivedjudicial approval.
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provision only in the case of stepparent adoptions. 47 In the case of a
stepparent adoption the court will review a signed written agreement
permitting the biological parent to visit or communicate with the adoptee
after the adoption is finalized. 4 The court may approve the agreement if
it finds that it is in the best interests of the child. In making that
determination, the court may evaluate the preference of the adoptee, the
length and quality of any existing relationship between the adoptee and
the biological parent, the likely effect on the adoptee of allowing the
relationship to continue, and the capability of the pardes to the agreement
to cooperate in performing its terms. In the case of a step-parent
adoption, neither failure to comply with the agreement nor a later action
to enforce, modify, or set aside the agreement is a ground for challenging
the validity of the adoption. 49
3. The UAA Allows Open Adoption Only When It Ieets the Parties'
Needs
In discussion of open adoption, a number of benefits and risks are
usually postulated. Both are supported to varying extents by empirical
data. However, when all parties are willing to have ;n open adoption, as
in the UAA provision, open adoption appears to benefit all parties.
In an open adoption, birth mothers may experience less separation
grief because they had more control over the adoption process.' A birth
mother who had a role in choosing the adoptive parents may feel more
confident about her child's new home."' Birth parents who are
hesitating may be encouraged to choose adoption by the prospect of
continuing contact. A young birth parent may not want to lose contact
147. UAA § 3-901. In an earlier draft of the UAA, the provision on open adoption included
judicially recognized agreements for visitation or communication with a biological parent,
stepparent, grandparent, or sibling of the adoptee. UAA § 3-803(c) (Oct. 14, 1993 draft). The
provision was removed out of "political necessity." The drafting committee was aware of significant
opposition to the provision and felt that eliminating a general express provision authorizing
enforceable open adoption agreements was necessary to salvage the document as a whole.
Telephone Interview with Joan Hollinger, supra note 12.
148. UAA §§ 3-901, 3-902.
149. Id. § 3-904.
150. Baran & Pannor, supra note 72, at 120; Berry, supra note 68, at 127.
151. Berry, supra note 68, at 129 (citing studies that found the availability of open options was
related to the willingness to relinquish among teenage mothers).
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with his or her biological child, but may also not feel ready to take care
of a child. 5
While permitting ongoing contact, the UAA does not guarantee
ongoing contact because it does not contain an express enforcement
provision for all adoptions. Such a provision would have been a radical
departure from the present law of most states, and as such, would have
been likely to be divisive. However, the UAA does provide an express
enforcement provision in the critical case of stepparent adoptions. In a
stepparent adoption, more than in any other, the willingness of the
biological parent to give up his or her parental rights is likely to be
affected by the availability of future contact with the child. The need for
an express enforcement provision protecting the biological parent's
decision seems more pressing and necessary in this situation.
Adoptive parents will have fewer fears about their child's history in an
open adoption and will be less likely to blame problems in the adoption
itself on genetics than in the traditional closed adoption."3 They will
probably be reassured by the greater availability of information about the
biological family. 4 Adoptive parents need not feel insecure and
threatened by having a birth parent as part of their child's life... because,
under the UAA, they control the contact. In the case of stepparent
adoption, the adoptive parent is not in complete control of the situation
because the biological parent can go to court to enforce the agreement if
necessary. However, the adoptive parent has control over whether to
enter into the agreement in the first place, and may petition to modify the
agreement later if the situation warrants.
The UAA will please those attorneys and agencies who advocate open
adoption,"' while having little impact on those who do not. Agencies
and attorneys may find that more children are available for adoption, as
more birth parents feel comfortable giving their children up with an
agreement for ongoing contact. 7
152. See, e.g., In re A.V.D., 62 Wash. App. 562, 573 n.10, 815 P.2d 277, 280 n.10 (1991) ("It
appears that an ideal solution here would have been an open adoption by the maternal grandparents.
This would have assured V the permanence she needs and that the statute dictates while allowing her
emotional connection with her father to continue despite his admitted inability to care for her. Under
the statutory scheme, however, the trial judge lacked the authority to permit such a solution.")
153. Baran & Pannor, supra note 72, at 120; Berry, supra note 68, at 126, 131.
154. Berry, supra note 68, at 131.
155. Id.
156. See, eg.. Baran & Pannor, supra note 72, at 119 ("We believe that confidentiality and
anonymity are harmful and that adoption should be open.")
157. Berry, supra note 68, at 127.
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The state, as administrator and protector of the child, benefits from
open adoption when children in alternative care are finally released for
adoption by a biological parent who simply wants some communication
with the child. The way in which the UAA approaches open adoption
protects the state from nasty court battles when relationships sour by
providing either no express enforcement provision, or, in the case of
stepparent adoptions, separating the validity of the adoption from
compliance with the contact agreement.
The adopted child benefits the most from open adoption. The child
may avoid the identity confusion that often accompanies confidential
adoption; open adoption may also alleviate many of the fears and
fantasies adopted children sometimes have about their birth families.'58
Having grown up knowing something about his or her birth family, an
adoptee will not be compelled to search for them upon gaining
adulthood.'5 9 An older child may particularly benefit by maintaining
contact with important people in his or her life while still growing up in a
stable home. Open adoption may not be right for every child. However,
under the UAA, all the parties have to agree in order to have an open
adoption. In the case of a stepparent adoption, the judge has discretion to
look particularly at the child's wishes if the child is old enough to have
any, and the nature of the relationship between the child and the
biological parent. If refusing to approve an agreement would be better
for the child, as it might in the case of an abusive biological parent, the
judge may reject such an arrangement. Either way, the child is well
protected.
The empirical evidence indicates that open adoption can be a valuable
alternative in some circumstances. Where adoptive parents planned for
openness from the beginning and are in control of the contacts, most of
them are pleased with the adoption."6 Many feel that it is in the best
interests of their children to know something about their biological
families. The evidence suggests that open adoption is particularly
appropriate with older children who remember their former living
situations. 6' The UAA list of considerations for the judge to weigh in
stepparent adoptions, such as the child's prefere:ace and nature and
duration of the previous relationship, helps the judge in allowing open
adoption when it is most appropriate. Not making the adoption
158. Id. at 127-128.
159. Id. at 128; Baran & Pannor, supra note 72, at 120.
160. Berry, supra note 68, at 132.
161. Id. at 128.
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contingent on the agreement reduces the potential manipulation of the
adoptive parents by birth parents and ensures stability for the child.
V. CONCLUSION
The three provisions of the proposed Uniform Adoption Act discussed
above are illustrative of the types of issues faced in adoption today.
There are no easy answers or perfect solutions that will please everyone.
The best available solution requires a careful balancing of the needs and
interests of everyone involved, with the focus always on the best interests
of the child.
Every state should seriously consider adoption of the UAA, or at least
particular provisions of it. The result of widespread, uniform adoption
laws will be a more predictable, efficient and fair adoption system.
Uniform state statutes permit the development of a broader body of case
law on which to rely. The issue of which state's laws apply to a
particular adoption will disappear when states have the same law.
Adoptions will take place in the most convenient place for the parties and
fewer actions will be filed in multiple courts with extended appeals.
Uniformity in adoption law is not going to happen overnight. States
will be reluctant to make dramatic changes in such a sensitive area of the
law. Differing opinions will pull states in opposite directions on some of
the more difficult issues. However, every step that is made toward
uniformity makes adoption easier. And easier adoption is in the best
interests of the child.
